ALF ROSS ON FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

Abstract

Although Alf Ross is primarily known for his general philosophy of law, his contributions to the philosophy of criminal law – particularly regarding criminal responsibility – also offer an original and inspiring perspective. This paper focuses not on Ross’s conceptual analysis of responsibility as the so-called tû-tû concept (a position already widely discussed in the relevant literature), but rather on his approach to the substantive conditions of criminal responsibility, especially the condition of freedom. Ross regards himself as a compatibilist: he argues that freedom from compulsion – not freedom of the will in a metaphysical sense – is sufficient for responsibility ascriptions. He explicitly rejects metaphysical free will as a fiction, yet simultaneously asserts that ‘complete determinism’ is incompatible with responsibility. This creates a tension within his account: if freedom of the will is not a necessary condition of responsibility, why should determinism pose a threat to responsibility at all? Thus, there appears to be a fundamental rupture in Ross’s argument. As a result, Ross’s final position appears incoherent – or, at best, ambiguous.