en
Studia Iuridica

Sophisticated Textualism and Sanctions

2019, 82, No. 1

Tomasz Zyglewicz

University of Warsaw

DOI

10.5604/01.3001.0013.9854

Publication date

02.03.2020

Publishing model

open access

License type

CC BY 4.0 Int.

Field

Law

Discipline

law

Language of publication

English

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Article

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Abstract

In this paper I present a difficulty for Matczak’s sophisticated textualism. I argue that, due to his claims about the descriptive character of legal language and the unity of the possible world postulated by the legal text, his theory cannot successfully account for norms that express factors that an authority should take into account when determining the measure of sanction. I reject two replies to this objection that do not require a modification of Matczak’s account. The upshot of my argument is that in order to accommodate norms pertaining to sanctions, Matczak should drop the assumption of unity of the possible world described by the legal text.

Keywords:

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